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REPORTABLE JUDGMENT · STRUCTURED SUMMARY

Supreme Court Draws Jurisdictional Line: Appropriate Authority, Not Police, Investigates PCPNDT Offences

The Supreme Court has held that offences created by the PCPNDT Act must be investigated through its specialised Appropriate Authority mechanism, with police confined to supplemental assistance in that field while remaini…

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LAW UNITED · SUPREME COURT DESKREPORTABLE

2026-08-20 — State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. v. Brij Pal Singh & Anr.

Published 23 August 202619 min readAutomatically processed

Criminal Procedure

Health / Medical Regulation

The Supreme Court has held that offences created by the PCPNDT Act must be investigated through its specialised Appropriate Authority mechanism, with police confined to supplemental assistance in that field while remaining free to investigate genuinely independent general-law offences.

CASE DETAILS

CaseState of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. v. Brij Pal Singh & Anr.
Neutral citation2026 INSC 901
Case numbersCriminal Appeal No. 2938 of 2025
Diary numbersDiary No. 22340/2025
Judgment date2026-08-20
CourtSupreme Court of India
JurisdictionCriminal Appellate Jurisdiction
Case typeCriminal Appeal on certificate under Articles 134A and 134(1)(c) of the Constitution
PlaceNew Delhi
DispositionThe Supreme Court answered the three certified questions, held that the Appropriate Authority is the competent investigator for PCPNDT offences and police may act only supplementally in that statutory field, held that a Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a PCPNDT offence on a police chargesheet, remanded the matter to the Allahabad High Court for decision in accordance with the judgment, and disposed of the appeal.

BENCH

Coram: Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh. Opinion authored by: Justice Sanjay Karol.

WHAT THE SUPREME COURT HELD

  • For offences under the PCPNDT Act, the police are not the statutory investigating authority merely because Section 27 classifies those offences as cognizable and non-bailable. [1] (paras ¶11, Answer 1; PDF pp. 59)
  • Section 17(4) places investigation of PCPNDT complaints with the Appropriate Authority, while Rule 18A(3)(iv) requires police involvement to be avoided as far as possible; police assistance is therefore only supplemental and must remain under the Appropriate Authority's supervision. [1] (paras ¶11, Answer 2; PDF pp. 59)
  • Section 28 creates a statutory bar against a Magistrate taking cognizance of a PCPNDT offence on a police chargesheet; cognizance must arise through the complaint routes specified by the Act. [1] (paras ¶11, Answer 3; PDF pp. 60)
  • The restriction on police investigation is confined to PCPNDT offences and does not prevent police from investigating a genuinely independent offence under the IPC, BNS or another general penal law disclosed by the same transaction. [1] (paras ¶11, Answer 1, Kotiswar Singh J., ¶¶2, 11; PDF pp. 59, 62, 70)
  • The appeal was disposed of after answering the certified questions, and the matter was remanded to the Allahabad High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling. [1] (paras ¶¶12-13; PDF pp. 60)

BACKGROUND

  • The proceeding arose from allegations that Respondent No. 1 and others were involved in illegal foetal-sex determination in Bulandshahar; the allegations are recorded as the prosecution case and were not adjudicated as guilt in this appeal. [1] (paras ¶1; PDF pp. 3)
  • After receiving secret information, the District Magistrate, Bulandshahar—described in the judgment as the Appropriate Authority—deputed the Tehsildar of Khurja as an authorised officer for a decoy operation, followed by a raid and initiation of proceedings. [1] (paras ¶1; PDF pp. 3)
  • FIR No. 628 of 2017 led to a chargesheet invoking Sections 315 and 511 IPC and Sections 4, 5(2), 6(a), 23 and 25 of the PCPNDT Act. [1] (paras ¶1; PDF pp. 3)
  • The dispute before the Supreme Court was procedural and institutional: which authority may investigate PCPNDT offences and through what route a court may take cognizance, rather than whether the underlying allegations were factually proved. [1] (paras ¶¶1-3; PDF pp. 3, 4)

Procedural history

  • Brij Pal Singh invoked Section 482 CrPC before the Allahabad High Court seeking quashing of the chargesheet and related proceedings. [1] (paras ¶1; PDF pp. 3)
  • The Allahabad High Court allowed the quashing petition after surveying conflicting High Court authority on police investigation under the PCPNDT Act. [1] [5] (paras ¶¶2-3; PDF pp. 3, 4)
  • Because High Courts had taken divergent positions, the Allahabad High Court certified the matter for appeal under Articles 134-A and 134(1)(c) of the Constitution on three questions concerning FIR registration, investigation and cognizance. [1] [5] (paras ¶¶1-3; PDF pp. 3, 4)
  • The Supreme Court appointed Senior Advocate Mukta Gupta as amicus curiae and also heard extensive assistance from members of the Bar, the Union of India and the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. [1] (paras ¶5 and sub-paragraphs; PDF pp. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33)

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

  • Whether an FIR may be registered at a police station for offences under the PCPNDT Act solely because Section 27 makes those offences cognizable and non-bailable. [1] (paras ¶2, ¶11, Question 1; PDF pp. 4, 59)
  • Whether police may investigate PCPNDT offences and, if not, which statutory authority is competent to investigate complaints under the Act. [1] (paras ¶2, ¶11, Question 2; PDF pp. 4, 59)
  • Whether a competent Magistrate may take cognizance of a PCPNDT offence on a chargesheet filed after police investigation. [1] (paras ¶2, ¶11, Question 3; PDF pp. 4, 60)

PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

Amicus curiae

Mukta Gupta

  • The amicus submitted that the PCPNDT Act entrusts investigation to the Appropriate Authority and that Section 28's complaint mechanism is mandatory, with Rule 18A reinforcing the statutory preference against police investigation. [1] (paras ¶5 (amicus submissions); PDF pp. 22, 23, 24)
  • The amicus submitted that police may render ancillary assistance where required but cannot become the principal investigating agency for offences created by the PCPNDT Act. [1] (paras ¶5 (amicus submissions); PDF pp. 22, 23, 24)
Assisting counsel favouring the special statutory investigation route

Pramod Kumar Dubey, Siddharth Aggarwal, Sakshi Arora, Vikalp Sharma, Meera Kaura Patel

  • Assisting counsel supporting the special-statute route argued that the PCPNDT Act's investigation-and-complaint architecture overrides the general CrPC process to the extent of inconsistency and that a police report cannot substitute for the complaint required by Section 28. [1] (paras ¶5 (submissions of assisting counsel); PDF pp. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29)
  • They nevertheless accepted that police may investigate an independent IPC or other general-law offence whose ingredients are separately disclosed, even when the facts overlap with a PCPNDT contravention. [1] (paras ¶5 (submissions of assisting counsel); PDF pp. 25, 26, 27, 28)
Counsel supporting a broader police role

Gyanendra Kumar, Harshit Sharma

  • Counsel supporting a broader police role argued that making every offence cognizable under Section 27 would be deprived of practical meaning if police could neither register an FIR nor investigate, and that the Act contains no express exclusion of the CrPC. [1] (paras ¶5 (submissions supporting police role); PDF pp. 27, 28, 29, 30)
  • It was also argued that the words 'as far as possible' in Rule 18A(3)(iv) are directory and leave room for police involvement. [1] (paras ¶5 (submissions supporting police role); PDF pp. 28, 29, 30)
Union of India

Union of India

The Union of India argued that Section 28 limits the mode of cognizance but does not, by itself, bar pre-cognizance police registration or investigation, and that Section 27 should retain operative meaning. [1] (paras ¶5 (Union of India submissions); PDF pp. 30, 31, 32)
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare

Ministry of Health and Family Welfare

The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare submitted that police assistance cannot be ruled out and suggested that police may investigate where appropriate, while cognizance under the PCPNDT Act must still comply with Section 28. [1] (paras ¶5 (Ministry submissions); PDF pp. 31, 32, 33)

COURT'S ANALYSIS AND REASONING

The PCPNDT Act creates a specialised enforcement architecture

  • Sections 17 and 17A assign the Appropriate Authority both investigative functions and specialised powers, including investigation of complaints, independent investigation, summoning, production of material and issuance of search warrants. [1] [3] (paras ¶¶6.1-6.6; PDF pp. 33, 34, 35)
  • Section 30 separately gives the Appropriate Authority search-and-seizure power and expressly imports CrPC search-and-seizure procedure, which the Court treated as evidence that general criminal procedure applies only where the special law permits or leaves space for it. [1] [3] [4] (paras ¶¶6.1-6.6, ¶10.1; PDF pp. 34, 35, 45, 46)

Sections 27 and 28 must be read together

  • The Court refused to read the word 'cognizable' in Section 27 as independently conferring police investigative power when Section 28 prescribes a special and exclusive complaint route for cognizance. [1] [3] (paras ¶¶10.2-10.3, ¶10.6; PDF pp. 47, 48, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58)
  • A police investigation of a PCPNDT offence would ordinarily culminate in a closure report or chargesheet, but Section 28 prevents cognizance on that chargesheet; the Court considered that mismatch a strong indication that police are not the Act's principal investigators. [1] (paras ¶10.3; PDF pp. 49, 50)
  • The Court treated Section 28 as jurisdictional and prohibitory: its two complaint routes make the Appropriate Authority indispensable to prosecution under the special Act. [1] [3] (paras ¶10.3; PDF pp. 49, 50)

Special law prevails over inconsistent general criminal procedure

  • The Court applied the settled principle that a special statute's prescribed procedure prevails over the CrPC or BNSS to the extent of inconsistency, while general procedure continues to operate in areas the special statute does not displace. [1] [4] (paras ¶10.1; PDF pp. 45, 46, 47)
  • The Court relied on analogous special-statute decisions concerning organ transplantation, drugs and cosmetics, mining, wildlife and unlawful conversion to distinguish between offences reserved to a statutory authority and independent general-law offences that police may still investigate. [1] (paras ¶¶9.1-9.6; PDF pp. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44)

Rule 18A has statutory force and limits police involvement

  • Because the PCPNDT Rules are made under statutory authority and laid before Parliament, the Court held that Rule 18A has statutory force. [1] (paras ¶10.4; PDF pp. 50, 51)
  • The words 'as far as possible' do not make police participation a parallel primary route; they leave room for assistance only when the Appropriate Authority requires it, with the Appropriate Authority retaining control. [1] (paras ¶10.4, ¶10.7; PDF pp. 50, 51, 52, 58)

Lalita Kumari does not override the special statutory scheme

  • The general rule requiring registration of an FIR when information discloses a cognizable offence does not answer the prior jurisdictional question whether police are the agency authorised by a special statute to investigate that offence. [1] (paras ¶10.5; PDF pp. 52, 53, 54)
  • For a PCPNDT-only offence, the Court answered that jurisdictional question against an independent police investigation because the special Act assigns investigation and prosecution to the Appropriate Authority and Section 28's complaint route. [1] (paras ¶¶10.5-10.7; PDF pp. 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58)

Parallel tracks for genuinely distinct general-law offences

  • Justice Kotiswar Singh's concurrence explained that one factual transaction may produce two legally distinct procedural tracks: an Appropriate-Authority-led PCPNDT investigation and a police investigation into an independently constituted IPC, BNS or other general-law offence. [1] (paras Kotiswar Singh J., ¶¶1-2, 11; PDF pp. 61, 62, 70)
  • The concurrence adopted an ingredients-based approach: overlap in persons, premises, records or facts does not permit either agency to take over the other's statutory field. [1] (paras Kotiswar Singh J., ¶¶11-13.7; PDF pp. 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75)
  • Police may provide protection, tracing, forensic, digital, logistical or scene-preservation assistance when sought by the Appropriate Authority, but such assistance cannot become an independent PCPNDT investigation or culminate in a police chargesheet for the special-law offence. [1] (paras Kotiswar Singh J., ¶¶5, 12-13.7; PDF pp. 65, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75)

RATIO DECIDENDI

  • The PCPNDT Act is a special statute whose own enforcement procedure displaces the general police-investigation route for offences created by that Act to the extent of inconsistency. [1] (paras ¶¶10.1-10.7, ¶11; PDF pp. 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60)
  • Sections 17(4) and 17A make the Appropriate Authority the competent investigating authority for PCPNDT offences; police involvement, when required, is supplemental rather than substitutive. [1] [3] (paras ¶10.7, ¶11, Answer 2; PDF pp. 58, 59)
  • Section 27's classification of PCPNDT offences as cognizable and non-bailable cannot be interpreted to nullify Section 28's exclusive complaint-based cognizance mechanism. [1] [3] (paras ¶¶10.3, 10.6, ¶11, Answers 1 and 3; PDF pp. 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60)
  • A Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a PCPNDT offence on a police chargesheet; cognizance must conform to Section 28. [1] [3] (paras ¶11, Answer 3; PDF pp. 60)
  • The bar is offence-specific, not transaction-wide: police remain competent to investigate an independently constituted IPC, BNS or other general-law offence arising from the same facts, while the PCPNDT component must remain with the Appropriate Authority. [1] (paras ¶11, Answer 1, Kotiswar Singh J., ¶¶2, 11-13.7; PDF pp. 59, 62, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75)

OBITER / IMPORTANT CASE-SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS

The judgment's binding core is the allocation of investigative and cognizance authority. The observations below explain statutory purpose and consequences but are not necessary to state the three certified answers.

  • The Court observed that the PCPNDT regime requires medical and technical sensitivity and that the statutory design also guards against harassment or intimidation of doctors while pursuing its socially beneficial objective. [1] (paras ¶¶10.6-10.7; PDF pp. 57, 58)
  • The Court indicated that the expression 'non-bailable' in Section 27 can retain meaning without converting police into the statutory investigator; the classification may still affect bail consequences when proceedings validly arise under the special Act. [1] (paras ¶10.2; PDF pp. 47, 48)

FINAL RULING AND DIRECTIONS

  • The three certified questions concerning FIR registration, investigation and cognizance under the PCPNDT Act are answered in accordance with the judgment. [1] (paras ¶11; PDF pp. 59, 60)
  • The matter is remanded to the Allahabad High Court to decide the case in accordance with the Supreme Court's judgment. [1] (paras ¶12; PDF pp. 60)
  • The appeal and any pending applications are disposed of. [1] (paras ¶13; PDF pp. 60)
  • Where information received by police discloses only a PCPNDT contravention, police must make the appropriate station or diary entry, transmit the information and material without avoidable delay to the notified Appropriate Authority, and must not commence an independent PCPNDT investigation. [1] (paras Kotiswar Singh J., ¶13.1; PDF pp. 72)
  • Where the same information also discloses a genuinely independent cognizable IPC, BNS or other general-law offence, police may register and investigate that distinct offence but must simultaneously communicate the PCPNDT component to the Appropriate Authority and may not investigate that component merely because facts overlap. [1] (paras Kotiswar Singh J., ¶13.2; PDF pp. 72, 73)
  • If a lawful police investigation into a general offence reveals a possible PCPNDT contravention, the investigating officer must promptly notify the Appropriate Authority and place the relevant material before it; police may continue only with the independent general-law component and assist the Appropriate Authority only when asked. [1] (paras Kotiswar Singh J., ¶13.3; PDF pp. 73)
  • If the Appropriate Authority encounters material disclosing a distinct IPC or BNS offence, it must promptly communicate that information and material to the jurisdictional police without taking over the general-crime investigation. [1] (paras Kotiswar Singh J., ¶13.4; PDF pp. 73, 74)
  • Police assistance in a PCPNDT investigation must ordinarily arise from a specific request by the Appropriate Authority, remain supplemental, and be recorded where substantial; the Appropriate Authority cannot abdicate its statutory functions, and police assistance must never become an independent PCPNDT investigation or police chargesheet. [1] (paras Kotiswar Singh J., ¶13.5; PDF pp. 74, 75)
  • In a general-law investigation arising from the same medical transaction, police may seek relevant inspection findings, forms, registration or seizure records and technical material from the Appropriate Authority; the Appropriate Authority may likewise seek lawful forensic, digital, logistical or protective police assistance without surrendering decision-making control. [1] (paras Kotiswar Singh J., ¶13.6; PDF pp. 75)
  • Neither agency may assume jurisdiction merely because both offences arise from the same transaction; the controlling inquiry is the ingredients of the offence and the statutory source of investigative power, and doubt about a possible PCPNDT contravention should be referred to the Appropriate Authority rather than resolved by police assumption of the special investigation. [1] (paras Kotiswar Singh J., ¶13.7; PDF pp. 75, 76)

STATUTES INVOLVED

InstrumentProvisionsRelevance
Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994Sections 4, 5(2), 6(a), 17, 17A, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 32 and 34Central special statute. The Court interpreted its investigation, police-assistance and complaint-based cognizance architecture. [1] [3]
Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996Rule 18A(3)(iv)The Court held the Rule has statutory force and that police involvement is to be avoided as far as possible, leaving only supplemental assistance when required by the Appropriate Authority. [1] [7]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Sections 4, 5, 154, 167(2), 173(2), 190, 202 and 482General criminal procedure contrasted with the PCPNDT Act's special enforcement mechanism and underlying quashing proceeding. [1] [4]
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023Sections 4 and 5The judgment noted the same special-law/general-procedure principle in the successor procedural code. [1]
Indian Penal Code, 1860Sections 315 and 511The police chargesheet in the underlying proceedings also alleged these general penal offences; the Court preserved police authority over independently constituted general-law offences. [1]
Constitution of IndiaArticles 134(1)(c) and 134AThe Supreme Court appeal proceeded on a certificate issued by the Allahabad High Court under these provisions. [1] [5]
Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994Section 22Used as a comparator special statute whose authorised complaint route displaces inconsistent general police-report procedure. [1]
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940Section 32Used as a comparator showing that special-law offences may have an exclusive prosecution route while independent offences under general law remain separately prosecutable. [1]
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957Section 22Used as a comparator for maintaining distinct statutory and general-law offence tracks arising from the same transaction. [1]
Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972Section 55Used as a comparator for a special statutory cognizance restriction tied to designated complainants. [1]
Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021Section 4Used as a recent comparator for a special statute restricting who may initiate proceedings despite the general CrPC framework. [1]

KEY PRECEDENTS AND THEIR TREATMENT

Precedent & CitationTreatmentPrinciple/Application
State of M.P. v. Manvinder Singh Gill, SLP (Crl.) No. 2226/2014, order dated 3 Aug. 2015referred_with_approvalAuthority to file a PCPNDT complaint is confined to the persons and officers specified or duly authorised under Section 28; merely assisting the Appropriate Authority does not itself confer complaint authority. [1]
State of Rajasthan v. Mohammad Imtiyaz, SLP (Crl.) No. 103/2023, order dated 28 Mar. 2025referred_with_approvalThe Court noted the prior Supreme Court order approving quashing of PCPNDT proceedings initiated through an impermissible FIR route. [1]
Ravinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2495referred_with_approvalThe judgment noted that an unlawful unilateral search by the chair of the Appropriate Authority had resulted in quashing, illustrating the importance of compliance with the special statutory mechanism. [1]
Naresh Kumar Garg (Dr.) v. State of Haryana, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 295referred_with_approvalThe Court considered the earlier treatment of Rule 18A and distinguished the question before it, while holding in the present case that the Rules have statutory force and police cannot become the primary PCPNDT investigator. [1]
Jeewan Kumar Raut v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 7 SCC 526appliedWhere a special statute mandates a complaint by an authorised authority and forbids a police report by necessary implication, general CrPC procedure yields at the point of conflict. [1]
Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674appliedThe Drugs and Cosmetics Act decision was used to support the proposition that police cannot independently investigate/prosecute an offence reserved to a special statutory mechanism, while independent general-law offences remain distinct. [1]
Rakesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2024) 12 SCC 473referred_with_approvalCited as following Ashok Kumar Sharma's special-statute enforcement principle. [1]
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772appliedUsed to explain that the same transaction may support a special-statute offence and an independently constituted general penal offence, each following its own procedural route. [1]
State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC 655referred_with_approvalThe Wildlife Act cognizance restriction was treated as another illustration of a special statutory prosecution channel tied to designated functionaries. [1]
Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265appliedThe Court relied on the principle that a special statute's restriction on initiation of proceedings prevails over the ordinary FIR mechanism. [1]
Parvinder Singh v. Enforcement Directorate, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 903relied_onCited for the principle that where a special statute prescribes a procedure, that procedure governs over inconsistent general criminal procedure. [1]
Moti Lal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2002) 4 SCC 713relied_onCited in support of the special-law-over-general-procedure principle. [1]
PEPSU Road Transport Corporation v. Mangal Singh, (2011) 11 SCC 702relied_onRelied on to establish that rules and regulations validly made under statutory authority have statutory force. [1]
State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639relied_onUsed to interpret the phrase 'as far as possible' as allowing controlled flexibility rather than creating a parallel compulsory route; in context, police involvement remains subject to the Appropriate Authority's direction. [1]
Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1distinguishedThe Constitution Bench rule on mandatory FIR registration for cognizable offences does not resolve whether a special statute has allocated investigative jurisdiction away from police. [1]
Shamarao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, (1952) 2 SCC 1relied_onRelied on for harmonious statutory construction that avoids absurdity and gives effect to the enacted scheme. [1]
CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57relied_onRelied on for construing statutory provisions so that the legislation remains workable and effective rather than futile. [1]
Vasant Ganpat Padave v. Anant Mahadev Sawant, (2019) 19 SCC 577relied_onCited for the golden-rule approach to literal interpretation when ordinary wording would otherwise produce absurdity or inconsistency. [1]
Govt. of T.N. v. Park View Enterprises, (2001) 1 SCC 742relied_onRelied on for the rule that where provisions of the same statute are irreconcilably inconsistent, the later provision prevails; this supported giving Section 28 full effect alongside Section 27. [1]

LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE

  • The judgment resolves a substantial conflict among High Courts by identifying the Appropriate Authority, not police, as the primary investigator for offences created by the PCPNDT Act. [1] (paras ¶¶3, 10.7, 11; PDF pp. 4, 58, 59, 60)
  • It converts the statutory distinction between a police report and a Section 28 complaint into a jurisdictional rule: a PCPNDT prosecution cannot reach cognizance through a police chargesheet. [1] (paras ¶¶10.3, 11; PDF pp. 49, 50, 60)
  • The concurrence supplies a practical nationwide coordination model for mixed transactions, allowing police to pursue genuinely independent general offences while preserving the special regulator's exclusive field. [1] (paras Kotiswar Singh J., ¶¶11-13.7; PDF pp. 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76)
  • The decision reinforces a broader special-statute principle: describing an offence as cognizable does not, by itself, displace a legislatively designed investigation-and-cognizance mechanism entrusted to a specialised authority. [1] (paras ¶¶9.1-10.7; PDF pp. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58)

PRACTICAL IMPACT — EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

  • For police stations, the ruling means a complaint disclosing only a PCPNDT violation should be recorded and routed to the notified Appropriate Authority rather than converted into an independent PCPNDT investigation. [1] (paras Kotiswar Singh J., ¶13.1; PDF pp. 72)
  • For Appropriate Authorities, the ruling increases responsibility for technically competent investigation and prosecution under the special Act; police support can be requested, but core statutory functions cannot be delegated away. [1] (paras ¶10.7, Kotiswar Singh J., ¶¶5, 13.5; PDF pp. 58, 65, 74, 75)
  • For mixed cases involving alleged PCPNDT violations plus independent IPC/BNS conduct, investigators should document the legal ingredients of each offence and maintain separate procedural tracks rather than treating factual overlap as jurisdictional overlap. [1] (paras Kotiswar Singh J., ¶¶11-13.7; PDF pp. 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76)
  • For Magistrates and prosecutors, the judgment makes the source of the initiating process decisive: a police chargesheet cannot itself support cognizance of a PCPNDT offence, even if police have lawfully investigated an independent general offence from the same transaction. [1] (paras ¶11, Answer 3, Kotiswar Singh J., ¶¶11-13.7; PDF pp. 60, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76)

SOURCE CITATIONS & ILI-STYLE BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. v. Brij Pal Singh & Anr., 2026 INSC 901 (Supreme Court of India, 20 Aug. 2026). Open source

[2] Supreme Court of India, Judgments Listing, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh, Crl.A. No. 2938/2025, Diary No. 22340/2025 (20 Aug. 2026).

[3] The Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994, Act No. 57 of 1994 (as on 31 May 2026). Open source

[4] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Act No. 2 of 1974. Open source

[5] Dr. Brij Pal Singh v. State of U.P. and Another, Application U/S 482 No. 6753 of 2019, Neutral Citation No. 2024:AHC:159207 (Allahabad High Court, 30 Sept. 2024). Open source

[6] Bar & Bench, 'Police cannot investigate sex determination offences under PCPNDT Act: Supreme Court' (20 Aug. 2026). Open source

[7] Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996, r. 18A(3)(iv), as inserted by G.S.R. 119(E), 24 Feb. 2014.

EDITORIAL NOTE

View linked judgment PDF